



## Fault injection effectiveness compared to reflection coefficient of antenna/target couple

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Most of our daily electronic objects store our personal data. One method used by attackers to retrieve this data consists in disrupting the operation of the component during the execution of a sensitive program [2]. For example, electromagnetic perturbation can disturb the electronic of a component and infer errors during the execution of the program and thus leak or modify sensitive information, which can jeopardize the system security [5].

To generate effective electromagnetic perturbations, the state-of-the-art fault injection community uses small hand-made antennas placed within a few millimeters to the target component [1]. These antennas are connected to a pulse generator of several hundred volts and tens of nanoseconds pulse. By moving the antenna over the component, an attacker goal is to determine the parameters (*i.e.*  $(x,y)$  positions and pulse amplitude) that maximize the probability of obtaining exploitable faults.

The fact that these antennas are handmade [4, 3] complicates the reproducibility of studies due to the geometry and the constitutive material variability. Furthermore, the input impedance of antennas is never indicated in fault injection related publications.

As antennas are placed in the near vicinity of the component under test (CUT), and because antenna far field properties are different from near field ones, it could be relevant to determine the input impedance of the antenna/target couple which can be computed from the reflection coefficient ( $S_{11}$ ) measured by a vector network analyzer.

In our work, we aim at comparing the probability to obtain a fault at a given position  $(x,y)$  with the frequency dependent absorbed power by the antenna/CUT couple. By doing so, we expect to be able to get information related to the sensitive frequencies of the CUT which might pave the way to narrowband (or continuous wave) injections.

## References

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